Abstract. Cloud computing and cloud storage are becoming increasingly prevalent. In this paradigm, clients outsource their data and computations to third-party service providers. Data integrity in the cloud therefore becomes an important factor for the functionality of these web services. Authenticated data structures, implemented with various cryptographic primitives, have been widely studied as a means of providing efficient solutions to data integrity problems (e.g., Merkle trees). In this paper, we introduce a new authenticated dictionary data structure that employs multilinear forms, a cryptographic primitive proposed by Silverberg and Boneh in 2003 [10], the construction of which, however, remains an open problem to date. Our authenticated dictionary is optimal, that is, it does not add any extra asymptotic cost to the plain dictionary data structure, yielding proofs of constant size, i.e., asymptotically equal to the size of the answer, while maintaining other relevant complexities logarithmic. Instead, solutions based on cryptographic hashing (e.g., Merkle trees) require proofs of logarithmic size [40]. Because multilinear forms are not known to exist yet, our result can be viewed from a different angle: if one could prove that optimal authenticated dictionaries cannot exist in the computational model, irrespectively of cryptographic primitives, then our solution would imply that cryptographically interesting multilinear form generators cannot exist as well (i.e., it can be viewed as a reduction). Thus, we provide an alternative avenue towards proving the nonexistence of multilinear form generators in the context of general lower bounds for authenticated data structures [40] and for memory checking [18], a model similar to the authenticated data structures model.
Introduction
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in remote storage of information and data. People outsource their personal files at service providers that offer huge storage space and fast network connections (e.g., Amazon S3). In this way, clients create virtual hard drives consisting of online storage units that are operated by remote and geographically dispersed servers. In addition to a convenient solution to space-shortage, data-archiving or back-up issues, remote storage allows for load-balanced distributed data management (e.g., database outsourcing). In such settings, the ability to check the integrity of remotely stored data is an important security property, or otherwise a malicious server can easily tamper with the client's data. When this data is structured, we need to provide solutions for authenticated data structures [39] , which offer a computational model where untrusted entities answer queries on a data structure on behalf of a trusted source and provide proof of validity of the answer to the user.
In this paper we study two-party authenticated data structures, a model closely related to memory checking [6] , where a client decides to outsource his data, which is stored in a data structure, to an untrusted server. However, the client needs to make sure that whenever he retrieves his data back, he is able to verify its validity, i.e., that nobody has tampered with it. In existing literature, a variety of authenticated data structures offer solutions that use different cryptographic primitives, such as cryptographic hashing (e.g., [6] ), accumulators (e.g., [35] ) and lattices (e.g., [34] ). The choice of the specific cryptographic primitive has a drastic impact on the efficiency of the authenticated data structure. For example it is known that, when using generic collision-resistant hash functions 1 the best one can hope for are logarithmic complexities (in the size of the data structure) [40] . On the other hand, using accumulators, which favor constant size proofs, has so far resulted only in sublinear solutions [35] , i.e., of O(n ) complexities (see Table 1 ). Deriving for example logarithmic time query algorithms (time to construct the proof) that come with constant size proofs and constant time verification has been an open problem.
This work begins by defining the notion of "optimal" authenticated data structures (see Definition 7), i.e., authenticated data structures that do not add any asymptotic overhead to the respective "plain" non-authenticated data structures.
2 Then we present an authenticated dictionary data structure that is based on a new cryptographic primitive that was recently proposed by Silverberg and Boneh, namely multilinear forms [10] , the construction of which remains however an open problem to date. The use of such a primitive gives an authenticated dictionary with constant communication and constant verification complexity, while maintaining all other complexities logarithmic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first optimal authenticated dictionary to appear in the literature, as it exactly matches the respective complexities 3 (update time, query time, answer size) of the optimal dictionary data structure (e.g., implemented as a red-black tree).
The multilinear form cryptographic primitive that is used in our construction can be described as the "multi" version of the well-known bilinear map. Although initially used to attack elliptic curve systems [28] , bilinear maps, being literally an efficient a tool for solving the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, eventually proved to be a very useful tool in cryptography (e.g., [7, 8, 9] ) after their first appearance in the literature for a "good purpose" [24] . However, the main limitation of bilinear maps is the fact that they cannot be applied twice, i.e., the output element cannot be fed back into the map e (., .) in an efficient way. Finding such maps, i.e., self-bilinear maps, which could be used in a recursive way to construct multilinear forms, was recently proved to be infeasible
